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ABSTRACT 
 
We discuss the recent emergence of ‘deliberative ecological economics’, a field that 
highlights the potential of deliberation for improving environmental governance. We 
locate the emergence of this literature in the long concern in ecological economics over 
the policy implications of limited views of human action and its encounter with 
deliberative democracy scholarship and the model of communicative rationality as an 
alternative to utilitarianism. Considering criticisms over methods used and the focus of 
research in deliberative decision-making, we put forward a research agenda for 
deliberative ecological economics. Given the promising potential of deliberative 
processes for improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of environmental decision-
making, work in this area could help advance both theory and practice in environmental 
governance. 
 
 
Keywords: sustainability governance, preference formation, democracy, 
environmental decision-making 
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1. Introduction 
“Picture a pasture open to all”. With this quasi-bucolic image, Garrett Hardin starts his 
description of how the Tragedy of the Commons unfolds in his well-known 1968 article 
in Science magazine. Addressing the Pacific Division of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science which he presided over at the time (the article is a reprint 
of his address), Hardin used the parable of ‘the commons’ to support his argument on 
the need to effect a moral transformation in governance through regulation and 
education in order to deal with the issue of overpopulation. Hardin argued that in a 
finite world, one’s decision to give birth implied reducing available resources for the 
rest, and paralleled this decision to that of using resources in what he called ‘a 
commons’. Using the example of a commoner deciding whether to add one more 
animal to hisi herd, Hardin posed that:  
 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding 
one more animal to my herd?” (Hardin, 1968: 1244; emphasis in original) 
 
He then went on to explain that this utility has a positive and a negative component, the 
former consisting in the herdsman reaping benefits from selling additional animal 
products and the latter mainly comprising the overgrazing created by the additional 
animal. However, the adverse effects of overgrazing are shared by all commoners, 
which results in our commoner’s utility being negatively affected only by a fraction of 
the whole negative impact making the decision to add one more animal in the herd as 
the only sensible course of action. With this logic, our herdsman carries on adding 
constantly more animals to his herd. What’s more, what is reasonable to him seems 
reasonable to the rest of the commoners. Thus each and every rational herdsman 
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sharing a commons does the same, i.e. adds more animals to his herd. That leads 
Hardin to conclude that: 
 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all. (Hardin, 1968: 1244) 
 
In the last forty years, numerous objections have been raised against Hardin’s 
assumptions as well as the implications of his conclusions. Nevertheless, the model of 
human action he put forth has been extensively used to justify and indeed legitimise 
natural resource management policies promoted by national governments and 
influential international organisations (e.g. the World Bank). Given some adverse social 
implications of those policies, several scholars have argued in favour of using other, 
broader models of human action when analysing environmental decision-making (e.g. 
Paavola & Bromley, 2002). The aim of this paper is to present a body of ecological 
economics policy-relevant research in environmental governance that has responded 
to this challenge with a view to developing tools for improving environmental decision-
making.  
 
This paper starts by describing some undesirable implications of using Hardin’s view of 
human action to analyse environmental issues to derive policy conclusions. It then 
moves on to briefly explain some key theoretical arguments regarding the limitations of 
this model and to present an alternative model of human action (communicative 
rationality) as a basis for developing effective and legitimate environmental decision-
making. Furthermore, the paper describes the work of ecological economists in this 
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area – which has given rise to a body of literature we call ‘deliberative ecological 
economics’ – and sketches the main traits of this work, to finally conclude with an 
outline of possible future research issues in that area emerging as a response to 
perceived weaknesses of existing research.  
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2. Environmental policy implications of ‘rational’ action 
Hardin’s explanation of environmental degradation has been duly criticised from 
various perspectives. First and foremost, it has been pointed out that his model does 
not describe a common property regime but rather an open access situation where the 
use of natural resources is not regulated by any rules at all. Instead, supporters of this 
thesis argue, ‘commons’ are well-defined systems governed by mutually beneficial and 
compelling regulations (Bromley, 1992). Others have taken issue with some of Hardin’s 
suggestions that privatising commonly-held resources could be the best solution for 
protecting valuable resources as it gives a private incentive to conserve them for 
private benefit. Critics point out that commons have successfully supported populations 
living in marginal (in terms of fertility potential) areas (Monbiot, 1994) and that 
commons privatisation results in making a few already rich landowners even richer 
(Franke & Chasin, 1981) while transforming commoner populations to social and 
economic pariahs (Kirkby et al., 1995). Enclosure of the commons results in the private 
appropriation of what used to be a common benefit (Thomas & Middleton, 1994). 
Moreover, Hardin’s critics argue that practice shows it is actually private owners 
(enclosers) who not only benefit from but also contribute to the demise of the 
commons, as they move in to aggressively exploit resources to their full potential and 
then quickly sell them off in order to acquire more promising resources in other areas 
(Monbiot, 1994).  
 
A central aspect of Hardin’s article, which has also been duly criticised, refers to his 
treatment of human behaviour as depicted in his example of the ‘rational’ herdsman. 
Specifically, this being is meant to make decisions by carefully weighing the utility gains 
and losses of alternative decisions. This is hardly an original view of human action as it 
is the one adopted by perhaps the most influential branch of economics: neo-classical 
economics. Standard neo-classical economics textbook definitions of human behaviour 
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have it that rationality entails making decisions after careful weightings of costs and 
benefits, always opting for that alternative that offers the higher utility gains to oneself. 
Herbert Simon (1957) defines this conception as substantive rationality, contrasting it 
with the complementary notion of procedural rationality that we discuss below. 
Philosophically based upon utilitarianism, this narrow definition of rational human 
behaviour has dominated mainstream economic models during the 20th century. 
Eventually, economists studying environmental issues also found it useful to adopt it for 
their analysis. According to this homo economicus model, rational human action as 
regards how to use environmental resources boils down to the moral stance of egoism, 
in which individuals seek to maximize their own utility without regard for the interests of 
others. As a result, individuals look at costs and benefits of alternative actions towards 
the environment in order to decide which one is best to follow.  
 
Since the mid-80s, Hardin’s insights have provided a rational argument for multi-lateral 
international institutions and western governments to pursue the widespread 
privatisation of natural resources and massive transfers of communal lands to the state 
or individuals in developing countries (Monbiot, 1994). Institutions such as the World 
Bank still put forward this logic in order to defend such natural resource management 
strategies as regards a new category of commons: the ‘environmental commons’. In a 
2002 article with the telling title ‘Global Priority’, the then president of the World Bank 
James D. Wolfensohn explained to the readers of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) official magazine that environmental services such as biodiversity 
constitute invaluable global commons that are not effectively protected by individual 
countries as these have “limited economic incentives for taking action on the global 
environment” (Wolfensohn, 2002: 4). But, Wolfensohn tells us, this is something to be 
expected as it is exactly in the nature of a global public good such as environmental 
services to attract decisions taken at the country level that do not adequately reflect 
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their global impacts. Consider for example a developing country rich in biodiverse 
rainforests but drawn into poverty. Its government would be happy to deplete all 
resources available in these forests for the country’s economic development, no matter 
if in the course of this use, several ecologically valuable species disappear. Here, 
Hardin’s ‘rational’ herdsman all-powerfully emerges again, only that in this case the 
individual herdsman comes in the guise of an ‘individual country’. The World Bank 
president further explains that this is what economists describe as a situation where 
“regional and global externalities are not internalised at the national level” (Wolfensohn, 
2002: 5). The author then points out that one of the Bank’s tasks is precisely to 
generate those – previously absent – markets in which global environmental goods and 
services and global non-market values can be traded. One such example is the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) where those values are captured primarily through 
international resource transfers.  
 
Similarly, the rational actor model of homo economicus underlies the recently 
established European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and its 
counterpart the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that aim to partly tackle climate 
change. This pollution permits trading scheme is premised on the idea that industrial 
polluters will act as ‘rational’ profit maximisers so that when they cannot afford reducing 
their pollution they will opt for buying a permit from more eco-efficient polluters who 
have already managed to reduce their pollution. As a result, the scheme expects to 
motivate more eco-efficient producers to reduce pollution themselves in the expectation 
of gaining money from selling spare permits. Alternatively of course, the whole scheme 
allows ‘rational’ polluters to invest in CDM projects instead of either trying to reduce 
their pollution or buy permits. In that case, industrial polluters, again acting as ‘rational’ 
profit maximisers, will prefer investing in sustainable projects that ‘cancel out’ their 
pollution (e.g. planting a forest or construct a wind farm in a developing country) 
C. Zografos & R.B Howarth: Deliberative ecological economics                                  
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
9
instead of directly reducing the pollution themselves, as long as the second option is 
more affordable to them. ETS and CDM are specific examples of institutions set in 
place to accommodate a profit-maximiser (homo economicus) rationality in order to 
achieve sustainability goals. Both institutions comprise economic and in particular 
market-based instruments that are used to achieve sustainable development (halt 
biodiversity loss and reduce unnecessary pollution). Both of these economic institutions 
for sustainable development result from policy initiatives of large and influential 
organisations such as the EU and the World Bank, hence their worldwide impact is 
considerable.  
 
On the ground, however, conflict hinders the success of GEF initiatives. These conflicts 
can reach extremities as in the case of the Komodo National Park Collaborative 
Management Initiative in Indonesia, where park security personnel fatally shot two local 
fishermen whom they suspected of fishing illegally within the park (Griffiths, 2005). 
Research suggests that several GEF projects overlook critical land tenure and property 
rights issues and remove control over decision-making and access to areas 
traditionally used by local indigenous communities (e.g. as hunting sites) (Griffiths, 
2005). These criticisms point out that GEF projects regularly treat local populations as 
beneficiaries rather than rights holders and that the whole initiative should adopt 
policies which secure local people’s rights to lands and territories, as well as their free 
prior and informed consent. Likewise, property rights issues underlie the limitations of 
ETS. Tradable pollution permits schemes have been criticised for not modifying the 
existing situation of injustice as regards rights and access to carbon sinks and 
reservoirs (Agarwal & Narain, 1991). Critics suggest that climate change policies 
should instead be looking to create fair shares of environmental space in terms of 
emissions equity, so that poorer nations are allowed to emit more greenhouse gases to 
develop and provide their citizens with much needed quality of life (e.g. health care 
C. Zografos & R.B Howarth: Deliberative ecological economics                                  
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
10
improvements). A similar criticism also applies for the CDM of the ETS scheme, as this 
transforms local assets into a mortgage for developed economies to continue growing 
and polluting, removing at the same time control over the use of these resources from 
the hands of poorer local populations (Pedace et al., 2005) through long-term resource 
leases and use constraints.  
 
Property rights issues with land and natural resources are at the heart of conflicts and 
concerns with economic institutions for sustainable development (such as the GEF, 
ETS and CDM). These mechanisms seem to limit local access to the ‘global commons’ 
and reduce local control over decisions made concerning them. The removal of 
property rights over these resources contributes to a form of environmental injustice as 
these mechanisms re-distribute costs and benefits from using resources (‘global 
commons’) to the disadvantage of poorer local populations. Homo economicus is the 
discourse used to legitimise and justify such policy instruments that facilitate this 
resource take-over, which suggests a crucial link between environmental justice and 
the use of this model of human action for policy analysis. Indeed, homo economicus 
seems to play a key role in this process: it is the central theoretical concept as regards 
human behaviour towards natural resources, which supports arguments used to 
analyse and chart policy that results in value disputes, conflict and injustice. In this 
way, Hardin’s model of human behaviour is used not only to conceptualise 
environmental problems but also to produce conflictive policy solutions. The diagnosis 
that the existence of facilities to trade externalities would help resolve environmental 
problems is entrenched in this homo economicus reading of human action towards the 
environment, which holds that individualistic, yet ‘rational’ behaviour is responsible for 
generating environmental problems (e.g. biodiversity loss, excessive pollution). This 
implies that from an environmental justice perspective, and in particular from the 
concept’s distributional and procedural aspects (Walker, 2009), it would be desirable to 
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seek an alternative model of human action that can be used in the analysis of 
sustainability policy.  
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3. Rational action: from instrumental to deliberative 
Further criticism of homo economicus from within the field of economics has pointed 
out that the model’s profit-maximising view of behaviour is unrealistic as it ignores the 
fact that that human action towards the environment may have broader ethical 
premises than egoism and that motivation for environmental action is embedded in 
multiple and possibly incommensurable environmental values and not just monetary 
ones. Moreover, when such a limited view of human action is used as a platform for the 
analysis of environmental issues it may end up generating counterproductive or even 
undemocratic policies, by crowding out environmental values necessary for 
sustainability or by altogether excluding them.  
 
Based on the observation of incommensurable and lexicographic environmental 
preferences, some critics have made a strong case that human action towards the 
environment should be understood in mainly ethical terms (e.g. Spash & Hanley, 
1995). This implies that environmental preferences correspond to ways that agents 
implicitly or explicitly decide how to answer the question ‘what is good and just’, which 
is the essential question in ethics. Importantly, this conception of human action towards 
the environment does not exclude a concern for individual welfare (Paavola, 2001). 
Normative ethics, the branch of philosophy dedicated to the study of the question ‘what 
is right and just’, postulates three major perspectives when answering this fundamental 
ethical question (Edward-Jones et al., 2000): consequentialism, which judges rightness 
of an action according to its consequences; deontological ethics, which judges the 
rightness of action according to its keeping with pre-established duties and rules; and 
proceduralism, which judges the rightness of action according to its keeping with 
legitimate procedures.  
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Ecological economists have proposed several models of human behaviour as 
alternatives to homo economicus. Most of them seem to fall within those categories of 
ethical action. For example, utilitarianism (either self or other-regarding) fits with a 
consequentialist mode of answering the ethical question (Paavola, 2001). Hierarchies 
of decision-making (lexicographic preferences) (Spash, 1998), expressive rationality 
(Hargreaves-Heap et al., 1992), incommensurability (Martínez-Alier et al., 1999), and a 
concern for protecting the rights of future generations (Howarth, 1995) fit quite well with 
the deontological perspective. Finally, rule-based behaviours such as satisficing 
(Simon, 1957), behaviour under risk and uncertainty (van den Bergh et al., 2000), and 
habitual behaviour (van den Bergh et al., 2000), which are premised on bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1957) that acknowledges informational and social constraints on 
behaviour (Baker, 2004) fit quite well with the procedural outlook. In several occasions 
(e.g. van den Bergh et al., 2000) environmental and ecological economists urge using 
these alternative models instead of the unrealistic, limited and limiting homo 
economicus to conceptualise human behaviour and conduct sustainability policy 
analysis (Nyborg et al., 2006; Turaga et al., in press). 
 
The need to improve the democratic legitimacy of environmental policies is a key point 
that underlies the quest for a broader view of human action that would allow 
considering plural motivations and avoid their exclusion from shaping sustainability 
policy. Norton (2005), for example, draws on the Pragmatism of John Dewey (1927) to 
describe an approach to environmental governance that combines elements of 
constructivism and empiricism. Pragmatism explores the interdependence between 
values and science in effective problem-solving, emphasizing the role of discourse and 
deliberation in legitimising both values and factual understandings. 
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For the purposes of the present discussion, a central aspect of the homo economicus 
view of human behaviour relates to the understanding of human action as instrumental, 
that is as a means for achieving predetermined goals, be they specific material (or not) 
outcomes or the satisfaction of moral principles and values. Here we turn on the 
contributions of Jürgen Habermas whose ideas have been used in public policy studies 
and have also been noted in ecological economics (O'Neill, 1993; O’Neill & Spash, 
2000; Vatn, 2005b). Habermas (1984; see also Walzer, 1983) considered the influence 
of instrumental action upon the democratic potential of institutions, associating the 
degradation of the democratic potential of major spheres of social life (e.g. state, social 
organisations, etc.) to their being taken over by models of strategic and instrumental 
rationality. According to him, this logic submits areas of public life under the logic of 
efficiency and control propagated by forces of economic (market) and administrative 
(state) rationalisation, which reduce human relations from communicative concerns to 
instrumental norms.  
 
Instead, Habermas advances communicative action as an alternative to instrumental 
action. Communicative action is based on the premise that the essence of rational 
action can also be to reach understanding between oneself and other actors or society 
in general instead of achieving instrumental goals. Such understanding is generated 
via inter-subjective communication between actors in the course of which they 
formulate views (change or else ‘shift’ their preferences) by reflectively considering the 
viewpoints of those with whom they communicate. In that sense, the type of action that 
is rooted on communicative rationality can reflect logics that go beyond instrumental 
seeking of pre-defined ends, which is the logic of action entrenched in homo 
economicus. Habermas believes that communicative rationality is better placed than 
instrumental rationality to advance the democratic development of society through 
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discussion and quest for consensus instead of instrumental action that seeks to 
achieve one’s own ends.  
 
With this in mind, advocates of deliberative democracy have established 
communicative action as the basis of a model of ‘genuine’ democracy due to its 
potential to generate consensus solutions through dialogue, reflection and preference 
change. Communicative rationality has been adopted by democratic theory to 
strengthen the argument that a deliberative form of decision-making – which facilitates 
reflective consideration of preferences – is the most legitimate form of democracy. 
Dryzek (2000) argues that during the last fifteen years democratic theory has taken a 
‘deliberative turn’, which aims to establish deliberation as a source of democratic 
legitimacy. Deliberative democrats stress the procedural aspects rather than the 
institutionalized mechanisms (such as elections, parliamentary procedures, etc.) of 
democratic decision-making (Sneddon et al. 2006). Arguing that those subject to a 
decision must be provided the ability or opportunity to engage in effective deliberation 
prior to decision-making in order for a decision to be legitimate, deliberative democrats 
postulate deliberation as the source of democratic legitimacy of public decisions.  
 
Deliberative democracy is embodied in the assumption that individuals can be 
transformed in the course of deliberative processes that bolster communicative 
rationality (Dryzek, 2000). An effective and legitimate type of deliberation requires the 
absence of power and coercion, the predominance of rational argumentation and 
critical discussion in order to promote reflection and enable a change of preferences 
(Dryzek, 2000). Such processes serve to formulate communicative rationalities that can 
then legitimately guide public decision-making. Importantly, ‘the only condition for 
authentic deliberation is then the requirement that communication induces reflection 
upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’ (Dryzek 2000, p.2).  
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Deliberative democracy seems to have a considerable capacity for generating 
genuinely inclusive and deeply democratic institutions and political processes. Not 
surprisingly, then, deliberative decision-making has been strongly advocated as a way 
towards creating an authentically responsive and responsible democracy, which in turn 
has prompted practitioners (e.g. government officials, civil society, etc.) to devote time 
and energy for strengthening citizen engagement through deliberative forums. Ever 
since its inception, ecological economics has developed a distinguishable line of 
research that focuses on environmental decision-making through work on multi-criteria 
analysis and in particular participatory environmental decision-making. As a result, 
ecological economists have not overlooked these developments side-by-side with the 
growing social science literature on the role of participation in environmental 
governance.  
 
C. Zografos & R.B Howarth: Deliberative ecological economics                                  
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
17
4. Deliberative ecological economics  
Ecological economists were quick to recognize the value of deliberative democracy for 
the study of environmental decision-making. The potential of deliberative processes to 
improve the legitimacy of policy decisions seems an obviously attractive prospect to a 
field long concerned with the legitimacy shortcomings of conventional methods of 
environmental decision-making such as cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Paavola & Adger, 
2005; Howarth & Wilson, 2006). As the capacity of preference aggregation to provide a 
genuinely democratic means for capturing the social value of the environment 
comprises a main concern with such methods (Martínez-Alier et al., 1999) the 
possibility of reflection and deliberation towards establishing some sort of ‘consensus’ 
group values advanced by deliberative decision-making unavoidably resulted attractive 
to ecological economists. Moreover, the communicative action view that preferences 
are formed during inter-subjective communication also coincides with ecological 
economists’ insistence that rational action may be better understood as procedural 
rather than substantive (van den Bergh et al., 2000). The emphasis on considering 
preference formation as a process, instead of seeing preferences as a priori held like 
conventional environmental decision-making methods such as cost-benefit analysis do, 
has proved useful to ecological economics. As ecological economics has long held that 
preference formation is socially constructed through institutional influences (Paavola & 
Adger, 2005; Vatn, 2005b) it has also argued that an attention at securing open, 
encompassing and democratic ‘value articulating institutions’ is crucial for legitimate 
and successful environmental decision-making (Vatn, 2005a). Deliberative 
democracy’s aim to pursue a public sphere of information, reflection, deliberation and 
consensual decision-making free of coercion as a policy objective, provides a pertinent 
model of such a desirable value articulating institution.  
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The view of preferences as procedurally-formed, non-aggregative and socially 
constructed and the suggestions in the deliberative democracy literature as regards 
desirable types of value articulating institutions prompted some ecological economists 
to consider using deliberative-type forums in order to study and elicit group 
environmental values via a method of ‘deliberative environmental valuation’ (Wilson & 
Howarth 2002; Aldred & Jacobs, 2000; Sagoff, 1998). Deliberative valuation comprises 
an attempt to turn the value elicitation process into a preference-constructing process 
in order to deal with the issues that people do not hold pre-determined preferences 
towards the environment and that such preferences should be deliberatively derived 
(Zografos & Howarth, 2008). Such attempts have provided interesting insights as 
regards the applicability and improvement of environmental valuation (e.g. MacMillan et 
al., 2006) but have also attracted scepticism over the potential to combine what appear 
to be two potentially conflictive processes of valuing the environment (Holland, 1997) 
and whether such a method is trying to combine two incompatible valuation processes 
(O’Connor, 2000). Some ecological economics scholars have even argued that in 
practice deliberative valuation serves to justify stated preference methods by adding 
often superficial forms of deliberation or discussion and that relevant studies in 
essence establish that the economic model they use is unsuitable for understanding 
particular sets of social values as regards the environment (Spash, 2008).  
 
Ecological economists have also shown interest in combining multi-criteria analysis 
with deliberative processes in order to arrive at more ‘precise’ and legitimate 
environmental preferences (Gregory & Wellman, 2001). This is not surprising given this 
methodology’s concern with incorporating multiple values in environmental decision-
making (Munda, 2008) and the interest of scholars with the potential of multi-criteria 
evaluation to transform policy analysis into a learning (communicative) process (Munda 
& Russi, 2008; Gamboa & Munda, 2007). On the main, most attempts employ 
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processes of deliberation and reflection for getting at a decision over the allocation of 
weights habitually used in multi-criteria analysis as a proxy for social preferences 
regarding the importance of the various goals that the model tries to satisfy. Relevant 
applications have proved useful for revealing the thinking and reasons lying behind 
environmental preferences (Kenyon, 2007), have shown potential to help understand 
crucial aspects of complex decision-making problems (Proctor & Drechsler, 2006) and 
have produced critical insights regarding the contrast between stakeholder policy 
priorities (derived via deliberative multi-criteria analysis) and government allocations of 
available resources for tackling environmental issues (Cook & Proctor, 2007). Although 
this literature has not yet been critically assessed, the applicability of the criticism 
regarding the superficiality of deliberation raised against deliberative valuation should 
also be considered here – particularly for studies where deliberation is reduced to an 
one or two-day process. 
 
A further criticism of deliberative approaches to environmental valuation relates to 
issues of representation (see Howarth and Wilson, 2006). Work by social 
psychologists, for example, suggests that deliberative mechanisms function best when 
they involve small groups of no more than fifteen participants. It is important that a 
variety of perspectives be represented to facilitate dialog and agreement across 
difference. In practice, deliberative groups often involve carefully selected stakeholders 
who are supposed to represent the beliefs and values of broader communities. Yet this 
raises the question as to whether groups of elite and sometimes self-selected 
stakeholders can reasonably act on behalf of society as a whole. Davies et al. (2005) 
have proposed a way round this “representation problem” with the use of Q 
methodology prior to deliberation which helps choose representative viewpoints and 
participants for deliberative forums. Nevertheless, the representation problem is 
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exacerbated by the high cost and demanding nature of deliberative processes, which 
can require multiple days of effort by the individuals involved.  
 
A second area of enquiry of the literature that combines deliberation with ecological 
economics has recently emerged. This goes beyond the preference formation 
applications to focus on the study of the politics of sustainable development and their 
influences upon environmental policy decisions (Zografos & Howarth, 2008). At the 
basis of the deliberative democracy paradigm lies an awareness of the need to 
acknowledge and legitimate plural values in public policy and decision-making. Several 
contributions in ecological economics share a concern towards the potential of today’s 
materially intensive and growth-oriented capitalist economy to achieve genuine ‘green’ 
outcomes (O’Connor, 1994) and its apparent failure to dematerialise (Roca et al., 
2001). Given that the imperatives or emergent properties sought by such a system may 
end up punishing the introduction of some types of necessary ‘green’ structures in the 
economy (Dryzek, 2000), the study of institutional orientations (rationalities) that do not 
exclude non-utilitarian values has become an important aspect of research in 
ecological economics (O’Neill & Spash 2000; Vatn 2005a).  
 
This field has emphasised the need to investigate the politics of sustainability and in 
particular the linkages between these and environmental policy by stressing the 
importance (Sneddon et al. 2006) and showing the value (Norgaard, 2007) of 
embracing a plurality of epistemological and normative ideas, interpretations and 
practices as regards sustainable development. Furthermore, it has underlined the need 
to open up public spaces for debating and enacting a politics of sustainability that will 
advance the concept and practice of sustainable development (Norgaard, 2007). Calls 
for value pluralism both in its epistemological and political dimensions also favour the 
adoption of critical views regarding the marginalisation of plural values as valid 
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discourses and practices of sustainable development and raise attention to issues 
relating to conditions and principles that are necessary for facilitating deliberative 
sustainability politics. Contributions in this field of cross-fertilisation between ecological 
economics and deliberative democracy have examined the importance of inclusive 
discourses over policies addressing serious environmental challenges such as climate 
change (Riedy, 2008) in an effort to identify policy principles better placed to facilitate 
inclusiveness of views and deliberation over sustainability. They have also examined 
the value of deliberative processes for encompassing a broad spectrum of 
epistemological perspectives in the diagnosis of environmental issues within the 
context of politically influential international initiatives such as the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (Norgaard, 2007).  
 
On-the-ground experience with deliberative forums for environmental planning, 
however, shows that formal and informal aspects of power prevent a fulfilment of public 
participation based on the power of citizens or the empowerment of weak groups in the 
sense of Habermasian communicative rationality (Pløger 2001). This effect has been 
attributed to the fact that power relations are not simply left at the door of deliberative 
forums the moment that actors enter them but are instead brought into and end up 
significantly shaping deliberation processes. For example, dramaturgical behaviours 
(Goffman, 1969) have been observed within deliberative forums, whereby front-stage 
performances or modes of interaction adopted by actors hide a very different power-
shaped reality that exists at a back stage, although ironically those artificial front-stage 
attitudes are taken to represent reality. This is the case of business representatives in 
some deliberative forums who avoid openly expressing their values and objectives in 
the deliberative process thinking that they may be too conflictive and instead prefer 
“alternative communicative channels to make their ‘substantive’ representations” 
(Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005:2131) to influential bodies such as government agencies. 
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Moreover, the heavy focus on ways of improving and innovating the format of 
deliberative institutions seems to have resulted in deviating attention from thorny issues 
such as the study of forums’ actual impacts on existing institutions and structures of 
decision-making (Bickerstaff and Walker, 2005). Hence the argument that efforts which 
emphasise the fairness and competence of decision-making processes are important, 
but more basic questions regarding the distribution of political power (inside and 
outside deliberative forums) and the institutional capacity for democratic change need 
be addressed to fully consider the importance of deliberative institutions (Bickerstaff 
and Walker, 2005). Similar points have been made in the past regarding ways in which 
the participatory management of local natural resources by village communities, which 
is now widely accepted as an institutional imperative in development initiatives, can 
exclude significant sections (e.g. women) and hence generate ‘participatory exclusions’ 
(Agarwal, 2001) and ‘value exclusions’ (Martínez-Alier, 2002).  
 
These points reflect a deeper, more conceptual criticism of Habermas’s ideals 
regarding the creation of ideal public spaces as a goal for public policy for its failure to 
take into account the power dimensions of discourse in the sense meant by Foucault 
(Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). This perspective underlines the normative effects of 
discourses upon social practices, i.e. that particular discourses involve a language of 
power communicated by and embodied in the specifics of particular social practices 
(e.g. legal punishment). In that sense, scholars criticise deliberative ideals for failing to 
notice that “participation (or discourse) is constrained by, hides and at the same time 
perpetuates certain sets of power relations” (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005: 2125). As a 
result, contributions in the planning literature flag the concern that the result of 
struggling to find shared values through deliberative processes may sometimes be the 
silencing of values instead of giving them voice (Tewdwr- Jones & Allmendinger, 1998). 
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5. A deliberative ecological economics research agenda 
Deliberative ecological economics could be fruitfully advanced by researching the 
implications of deliberative procedures for preference formation and the politics of 
sustainability. In this section we outline several potential research priorities. 
 
First, comparatively little empirical work has been conducted on the influence of 
deliberation on preference formation. One early contribution is Davis & Whittington’s 
(1997) analysis of a public works project in Uganda. In this case, participation in 
structured community forums refined and enhanced respondents’ willingness-to-pay as 
measured using stated preference techniques. On a different plain, Gregory & Wellman 
(2001) employed deliberative methods in a multicriteria decision analysis of wetlands 
restoration in coastal Oregon. Further examples are provided by Álvarez-Farizo & 
Hanley’s (2006) case study of the Water Framework Directive and by Dietz et al.’s 
(2009) analysis of people’s preferences regarding climate change mitigation policy. 
See also Hermans et al.’s (2008) study of watershed management in rural Vermont. 
 
Concerning the second strand of research in deliberative ecological economics that 
focuses on the politics of sustainability, power-related issues are at the heart of 
concerns raised as regards the actual potential of deliberative processes for policy-
making. As a result, a broader conceptual point as regards this second strand of 
research in deliberative ecological economics is that, given the centrality of power 
concerns in criticisms over the capacity of deliberative politics, researchers need to be 
clear about what they mean and understand as ‘power’ and ‘politics’. Here, researchers 
could benefit from the work done in the field of political ecology which studies the 
relevance of power for environmental issues in particular looking at the influence of 
power over environmental change and conflict. For example, Paulson et al. (2003) 
advance a political ecology approach to power that goes down two main lines of 
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enquiry. First, in line with Hornborg’s (2001:1) definition of power as “a social relation 
built on an asymmetrical distribution of resources and risks,” they emphasise the 
importance of exploring how power circulates among and between different social 
groups, resources, and spaces. This is a view of power as something that “presses on 
the subject from the outside, as what subordinates” (Butler, 1997:2) which has proved 
very useful for political ecology research. The second way of looking at power is by 
examining the ways people, resources, and places are constituted. This outlook follows 
Foucault’s view that power is formative, that it becomes embodied in social practice (it 
can even literally form the shape of human bodies) and that in this twisted way it may 
be seen “as providing the very condition of [a subject’s] existence and the trajectory of 
its desire” (Butler, 1997:2).  
 
In turn, politics are “found in the practices and mechanisms through which power is 
circulated” (Paulson et al., 2003:209). Environmental politics in particular, are a 
contested and negotiated domain expressed in “the practices and processes through 
which power, in its multiple forms, is wielded and negotiated” (Paulson et al., 2003:209) 
on multiple scales and contexts. These conceptualisations of power and politics are 
used to operationalise research on environmental change and conflict in order to better 
address practical problems such as resource degradation and social marginalization.  
 
A useful concept here could be that of procedural power, i.e. this sort of  “power which, 
in the face of complexity, is able nevertheless to impose a language of valuation 
determining which is the bottom-line in an ecological distribution conflict (Martínez-
Alier, 2002: 271). Procedural power has been used to conceptualise the operation of 
particular decision-making ‘shortcuts’ (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) which attempt to 
circumvent the complexity of environmental issues and the stagnation of public 
decision-making produced by conflict due to the existence of diverse and opposing 
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environmental values. In that sense, the concept describes how such ‘shortcuts’ 
operate as mechanisms of power, reducing meaningful discussion and deliberation 
over environmental priorities and values down to expert-based scientific assessments 
(e.g. monetary assessments of environmental assets). Considering the above-
mentioned criticism of the real transformative potential of deliberative policy processes 
suggests that similar mechanisms of power may as well be operating within 
deliberative decision-making. Research in deliberative ecological economics could 
focus on particular cases of deliberative forums for environmental governance and use 
participant observation (e.g. Peacock, 1986) of deliberative forums to identify these 
mechanisms and analyse their operation in order to improve the democratic legitimacy 
and effectiveness of such processes. 
 
Overall, the relevant literature that has developed during the last ten years or so seems 
to suggest that the ideal of communicative rationality is attractive and at least an 
attempt to approximate it seems an important goal that should be sought after with 
public policy (e.g. Innes & Booher, 1999). However, observations regarding the 
influence of power on communicative planning practice essentially point out that 
deliberative inter-subjective communication and decision-making can be distorted by 
institutionalised forces or extra-institutional agents. Such distortion may involve not only 
direct exercise of power, but also manipulation, propaganda, deception, etc. that can 
result in the dominance of some ideas over others, which strips deliberation from its 
democratic potential. This is why advocates of deliberative decision-making 
complement communicative rationality with the requirement that reflection induced 
through inter-subjective communication is made in a non-coercive fashion and that it is 
free from deception, self-deception, strategizing, and manipulation in order to achieve 
genuinely democratic decisions (Dryzek, 2000)ii. Research in deliberative ecological 
economics could add to this direction by asking questions such as “why and how does 
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power infiltrate deliberative decision-making over sustainability?” and could use case 
study research methods (Yin, 2003) to explore this. 
 
There is one clear important sustainability policy implication of instituting deliberative 
democracy at the foundation of environmental policy and this is that decision-making 
processes should function as ‘public spheres’ for deliberation to take place and 
facilitate preference shifts. Deliberative policy analysts agree on the centrality of 
dialogue for legitimate decision-making and underline the importance of conceptual 
tools to make such dialogues possible. Building on work done in interpretive policy 
analysis (e.g. Yanow, 2000) that puts emphasis on the meanings (imposed, 
challenged, intended and interpreted) of policies, deliberative policy analysis scholars 
have focused on discourse coalitions formed around different meanings of policies 
(Hajer, 2003). As preferences are seen to shape up in interaction, researchers suggest 
tools such as discourse analysis in order to analyse political formation, mutual 
positioning and the influence of particular policy discourses that bring together groups 
in the context of policy-making (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Such analyses explicitly 
attempt to identify the best means of integrating value pluralism in policy making by 
focusing on how ‘identities of shared preferences’ develop through deliberative 
decision-making processes. The objective is to learn more about the conditions where 
people re-position their distinct preferences during deliberation occurring in the context 
of interactive policy-making practices, particularly inside policy networks and the 
network society (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). This is mostly done by looking at how 
conflicts of value pluralism and identity are dealt within such processes. Similar 
developments in ecological economics have underlined the value of Q methodology for 
identifying discourses and linking them to environmental policy in order to improve the 
latter’s legitimacy by including plural and multiple values in sustainability policy (Barry & 
Proops, 1999). Research in deliberative ecological economics could contribute to this 
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by combining Q methodology with participant observation to explore the formation of 
discourse coalitions and the conditions under which this occurs in the form of people 
re-positioning their preferences inside deliberative forums in the absence of direct or 
indirect coercion.  
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6. Conclusions  
Deliberative ecological economics has sprung out of the preoccupation of some 
ecological economists with environmental value exclusion effects of the reductionist 
model of rational human action employed by mainstream economics to analyse 
environmental policy. Considering rational action as an attempt to reach understanding 
between oneself and others via inter-subjective communication, deliberative 
democracy postulates that decision-making processes should generate public spheres 
that establish conditions promoting debate of actors’ values and preferences in order to 
facilitate reflection and preference shift with a view to some sort of future consensus. 
Ecological economists have used those insights to improve research on the formation 
of social preferences towards the environment by introducing deliberation in 
environmental valuation exercises and in the course of developing multi-criteria 
analysis models. Other ecological economists focus on another aspect of deliberative 
environmental decision-making, namely its capacity to produce nuanced, 
comprehensive and inclusive visions of environmental issues, integrated into current 
political processes.  
 
However, work in deliberative environmental preference formation has been criticised 
for trying to combine two conflictive processes of valuing the environment (deliberation 
and monetary valuation) which results in many studies trying to justify stated 
preferences methods by often involving superficial levels of deliberation. Moreover, 
criticisms from the environmental planning literature suggest that deliberative political 
decision-making processes often fail as they ignore the practical context of power 
surrounding environmental planning. To this end, it seems valuable that future research 
in this field considers how power intrudes actual deliberative processes of 
environmental decision-making in an effort to release their full democratic and 
transformative potential. Further work along those lines can help advance both the 
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newly-formed field of deliberative ecological economics and improve knowledge and 
practice of environmental governance.  
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Footnotes  
 
i The choice of the commoner’s gender is Hardin’s. 
 
ii Another development related to the recent policy emphasis on deliberation, concerns the 
failure of the scientific discourse in some cases to provide definitive answers for some 
environmental issues (e.g. debate on global warming) which has helped substantiate the claim 
that scientific values are merely one more set of values that needs be considered side by side 
with other (e.g. lay) values. This has contributed to the emergence of post-normal science 
(Ravetz & Funtowicz, 1993) and the promotion of more interactive and inclusive forms of 
decision-making such as extended peer reviews, activist knowledge, etc. that bear 
characteristics of deliberative decision-making. 
 
